Challenges to "a Most Dangerous Doctrine" or a "Fantastic Theory" of Volitional Insanity

In theory, an insanity defence can take two forms: the cognitive form (C-insanity) and the volitional form (V-insanity). The defence of C-insanity recognises that a disordered state of mind can make the ability to understand the nature of an action impossible. On the other hand, V-insanity is recognised in some common law jurisdictions, such as all jurisdictions in Australia except for Victoria and New South Wales, and is a full defence. It recognises that a disordered state of mind can make the exercise of self-control impossible. However, that disordered state of mind does not necessarily affect the understanding of the nature of the act impossible

Regulating the genetic supermarket: Preimplantation genetic testing, parental choice and the harm principle

In 1974, in one of the most intriguing footnotes in the history of political theory, Robert Nozick postulated the existence of a Genetic Supermarket, a state of affairs in which prospective parents would be able to choose - to whatever extent technology allowed - the genetic characteristics of their children. The closing decades of the Twentieth Century saw this thought experiment become a possibility, with developments in reproductive and genetic technologies allowing ex utero embryos to be tested for the presence of certain genetic traits before a decision as to which to implant. However, as technological obstacles to the unfettered choice envisaged by Nozick have disappeared, they have been replaced by regulatory barriers. In this thesis, I examine the merits of a laissez faire approach to parental choice of offspring characteristics. Specifically, I consider the case for largely unrestricted access to preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), the technology that currently offers most possibilities in this regard, and which has been the subject of most discussion and controversy. My examination is considered predominantly with the interests of the various parties who might be affected by such choices, and in particular, with the prospect of harm to any of them. In Chapter 2, I argue that if our concern is with the avoidance of harm, we should acknowledge that curtailing the range of choices open to prospective parents results in a harm to them. Hence, any such restrictions much be justified by reference to the risk of a greater harm which such restrictions will plausibly avoid. In Chapter 3, I examine the purported harms that could be inflicted upon either those potential future children who would have been born but for their parents' use of PGD, or to the more tangible class of children who are in fact born as a result. With regard to the former, I argue that the attribution of interests (an essential prerequisite of harms) to merely potential beings is incoherent. Those children who are in fact born, however, are likely to be bearers of interests, and can therefore be the subjects of harm. Furthermore, I acknowledge that their unique origins, or the parental motives underlying them, could indeed see them faced with harms from which children born in more orthodox ways may be spared. However, it is my contention - a contention strongly influenced by the work of Derek Parfit - that such harms are likely to be outweighed by the benefits of existence, rendering it impossible to say of such children that they are harmed on balance. In Chapter 4, I consider the possibility of harms being occasioned to other parties, specifically, existing disabled persons and those who are denied access to the Genetic Supermarket due to lack of financial means. With regard to the former, I suggest that while harms - both subjective and objective - cannot lightly be discounted, a laissez faire approach which sees the state adopt a position of neutrality with regard to the selection of traits may diminish rather than exacerbate these. Likewise, considerations of justice create unease about the prospect of a Genetic Supermarket accessible only by the wealthy. This, however, forces us to confront wider questions about undeserved advantage, and leads me to ask whether the Genetic Supermarket approach would be any more unjust than the status quo. In my final chapter, I look critically at the decisions arrived at thus far by the various bodies charged with regulating access to PGD. In particular, the provisions of the Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act 1990, and the decisions of the Human Fertilisation & Embryology Authority which it established, are scrutinised. It is my contention that the decisions of the latter are sometimes inconsistent and difficult to reconcile with the ethical principles that they purport to uphold. In particular, they lack a coherent notion of harm, or of the duties that we owe to future persons

Challenges To 'A Most Dangerous Doctrine' or a 'Fantastic Theory' of Volitional Insanity

In theory, an insanity defence can take two forms: the cognitive form (C-insanity) and the volitional form (V-insanity). The defence of C-insanity recognises that a disordered state of mind can make the ability to understand the nature of an action impossible. On the other hand, V-insanity is recognised in some common law jurisdictions, such as all jurisdictions in Australia except for Victoria and New South Wales, and is a full defence. It recognises that a disordered state of mind can make the exercise of self-control impossible. However, that disordered state of mind does not necessarily affect the understanding of the nature of the act impossible

A Review of the Adequacy of New Zealand’s Regulatory Systems to Manage the Possible Impacts of Manufactured Nanomaterials

The full text is available here: http://www.academyconferences.com/pdf/nznanoreview.pdfThis report presents an independent review of the adequacy of New Zealand’s regulatory frameworks in dealing with manufactured nanomaterials (mNMs). In particular, it considers how regulatory oversight is triggered for mNMs, and identifies the existence of some potential regulatory gaps (a somewhat contested term which we discuss below). This project was completed by staff of the New Zealand Law Foundation Centre for Law and Policy in Emerging Technologies, Otago University, over the period March to December 2010. Our approach has closely followed that adopted in the report conducted by staff at Monash University in 2007, regarding Australia’s regulatory frameworks. In many ways, our overall conclusions are similar to those of the Monash Report, and indeed to other reports in this area. None of the areas of the New Zealand regulatory system that we have considered require wholesale changes in order to be applicable to mNMs. The regulatory mechanisms applicable to conventional products will, in broad terms, apply to mNMs, and to products containing and incorporating such products (though a possible gap was identified where the product actually creates nanoparticles, subsequent to sale.) In those areas where regulatory coverage is comprehensive for conventional products, it will usually be comprehensive for mNMs. The corollary, of course, is that areas of weakness in the regulatory frameworks will provide areas of weak regulation for mNMs too. We have, however, identified a number of possible regulatory gaps or weaknesses that are more specific to products containing mNMs. Our approach has distinguished between gaps that appear to occur at different levels: respectively, at the level of legislation, at the level of regulatory policy, and at the level of compliance and enforcement. The options for addressing those gaps will often depend upon which of these categories they are considered to fall within

The impact of artificial intelligence on jobs and work in New Zealand

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a diverse technology. It is already having significant effects on many jobs and sectors of the economy and over the next ten to twenty years it will drive profound changes in the way New Zealanders live and work. Within the workplace AI will have three dominant effects. This report (funded by the New Zealand Law Foundation) addresses: Chapter 1 Defining the Technology of Interest; Chapter 2 The changing nature and value of work; Chapter 3 AI and the employment relationship; Chapter 4 Consumers, professions and society. The report includes recommendations to the New Zealand Government

Algorithmic Decision-Making and the Control Problem

Abstract: The danger of human operators devolving responsibility to machines and failing to detect cases where they fail has been recognised for many years by industrial psychologists and engineers studying the human operators of complex machines. We call it “the control problem”, understood as the tendency of the human within a human–machine control loop to become complacent, over-reliant or unduly diffident when faced with the outputs of a reliable autonomous system. While the control problem has been investigated for some time, up to this point its manifestation in machine learning contexts has not received serious attention. This paper aims to fill that gap. We argue that, except in certain special circumstances, algorithmic decision tools should not be used in high-stakes or safety-critical decisions unless the systems concerned are significantly “better than human” in the relevant domain or subdomain of decision-making. More concretely, we recommend three strategies to address the control problem, the most promising of which involves a complementary (and potentially dynamic) coupling between highly proficient algorithmic tools and human agents working alongside one another. We also identify six key principles which all such human–machine systems should reflect in their design. These can serve as a framework both for assessing the viability of any such human–machine system as well as guiding the design and implementation of such systems generally

Lex Machina: Techno-Regulatory Mechanisms and 'Rules by Design'

The lure of technologies of perfect enforcement can be appealing to the public and irresistible to regulators. In this article, the author investigates both the phenomenon of ‘techno-regulation’, and the concerns it has generated, with a particular focus upon the geography of modern areas, road traffic and online interactions. The author makes three claims about techno-regulatory measures (TRMs). First, that they are already widespread, and likely to become more so as our lives become more urbanized and technologized. Second, that while come concerns about TRMs may be overstated or lacking in normative substance, there are valid reasons to be concerned about at least some examples of this trend. And third, that there are a number of questions we should ask about any proposed TRM, the answers to which should inform our institutions about its introduction. The article concludes that it may be the more apparently innocuous, insidious or invisible measures that should concern us most